Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem by Hayes, David L.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 15 | Number 3 Article 5
1-1-1993
Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a
Vexing Problem
David L. Hayes
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 653 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol15/iss3/5
Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New




I. Summary of the Step-Saver Decision ....................... 657
A. Background of the Case ............................... 657
B. Applicability of U.C.C. Section 2-207 to Formation of
the Contract ........................................... 659
C. Application of U.C.C. Section 2-207 to the Facts of the
C ase .................................................. 661
1. The Definiteness of the Contract ................... 661
2. The Shrinkwrap License as a Conditional
A cceptance ........................................ 661
3. Public Policy Concerns ............................. 663
4. The Terms of the Contract...... ..... . . 663
II. Implications of the Step-Saver Decision ..................... 664
A. Telephone Sales or Other Direct Marketing of Software. 664
B. "Over the Counter" Sales of Software .................. 667
III. Conclusion ................................................ 669
t © 1993 by David L. Hayes.
* David L. Hayes is Chairman of the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Fenwick
& West, Palo Alto, California. He specializes in intellectual property counseling, licensing,
litigation, and audits, and is a registered patent lawyer.
Introduction
Computer software companies rely widely on the use of "shrink-
wrap" license agreements in the mass market distribution of software.
"Shrinkwrap license" is the common term for unsigned license agree-
ments which state that acceptance of the terms of the agreement on the
part of the user is indicated by opening the shrinkwrap packaging or
other packaging of the software, by use of the software, or by some other
specified mechanism.
Computer companies have generally elected to license copies of
computer programs to end users, rather than to sell those copies, for the
following principal reasons:
(1) To negate the doctrine of "first sale," which holds that once a
copy of a copyrighted work has been sold, the copyright holder's rights
in that particular copy are exhausted, and the copy may be freely resold,
leased, lent or otherwise disposed of. Casting the transaction as a li-
cense-in which title to the particular copy of the program is not trans-
ferred to the user-is an attempt to avoid this doctrine so that the user
may not freely transfer the software to others or lend the software to
those who may illegally duplicate it, both of which cause lost revenue to
the software vendor.'
(2) To place the user on notice of the terms of the warranty; if any,
made by the vendor with respect to the software, and to disclaim other
warranties in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.).
(3) To impose upon the transaction other terms and conditions via
the license agreement, such as limitations on the permissible use of the
software, limitations of liability, choice of governing law, and other con-
tractual provisions.
Because the license agreement is the primary mechanism by which
software vendors limit the risks and liability arising from the distribution
of their products, the enforceability of shrinkwrap agreements is of great
significance. It has been the subject of serious doubt: until recently, only
two decisions have explicitly addressed the enforceability of shrinkwrap
1. The doctrine of first sale was codified by Congress in section 109 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act (Title 17 of the United States Code). Recognizing the problem of unscrupulous
software rental companies that were renting software to users who then made illegal copies of
such software, Congress amended the first sale doctrine as it applies to computer programs.
See Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1988)). As amended, the first sale doctrine permits only non-
profit libraries and educational institutions to lend or lease copies of software, although a pur-
chaser of a copy of a copyrighted computer program may still sell that copy to another without
the consent of the copyright holder.
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licenses. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. ,2 the district court stated
without explication that the shrinkwrap license at issue in that case was
"a contract of adhesion which could only be enforceable" if the provi-
sions of a Louisiana statute-which explicitly made such license agree-
ments enforceable-were valid and the statute was not preempted by
federal law.
The district court concluded that the Louisiana statute was not
valid, at least to the extent it would otherwise make enforceable the fol-
lowing provisions of a shrinkwrap license that the court concluded were
contrary to federal copyright policy4 :
(1) A prohibition on copying for any purpose, which is contrary to
section 117 of the copyright statute, permitting the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make an archival copy of the program.'
(2) A prohibition on making derivative works, which the court con-
cluded was an attempt to expand the rights of the copyright holder
which should rightly be within the exclusive purview of the copyright
law, since one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is the right
to make derivative works.6
(3) A prohibition on reverse engineering, which the court con-
cluded went beyond rights under trade secret law and invaded the exclu-
sive province of federal copyright law, since reverse engineering, at least
in certain forms, would be permissible under the copyright law.7
(4) A perpetual bar against copying, which extended beyond the du-
ration of the federal copyright.'
(5) Protection of any computer program, regardless whether such
program would qualify as an "original work of authorship" within the
definition of the federal copyright statute.9
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the Louisiana shrinkwrap statute was unenforceable by virtue of federal
copyright policy, but grounded its decision only on the fact that the Lou-
isiana statute made enforceable flat prohibitions on decompilation or dis-
assembly in shrinkwrap agreements. ' The Fifth Circuit concluded that
such a prohibition could prevent an owner of a copy of a computer pro-
2. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), affid, 847 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1988).
3. Id. at 761.
4. Id. at 763.
5. Id. at 762. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).




10. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
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gram from exercising the owner's right under section 117 of the copy-
right statute to make an adaptation of that program as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program.II Accordingly, the court
held that the Louisiana statute "touches upon an area" of federal copy-
right law and was to that extent unenforceable.1
2
These decisions focused on the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses
from two perspectives: (1) general unenforceability under principles of
contract law as a contract of adhesion, an issue whose resolution was left
unclear, and (2) the enforceability of specific substantive provisions of the
shrinkwrap license, particularly with regard to policies of federal
supremacy. 1
3
A more recent decision, Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech-
nology,'4 focused on the rules of contract formation under the U.C.C.
and their application when deciding if a shrinkwrap license agreement
governs a transaction at all-apart from rules concerning contracts of
adhesion-and, if so, which of the terms contained in the license are gov-
erning. In Step-Saver, the Third Circuit held that a shrinkwrap license
did not modify a previously existing contractual relationship that was
formed by acceptance of orders issued via telephone.
Although Step-Saver involved transactions between a software ven-
dor and a reseller in the context of some unique facts, the analysis of the
U.C.C. rules contained in the decision has potentially broader signifi-
cance for more garden variety transactions between software vendors and
end users that involve shrinkwrap licenses. This article summarizes the
Step-Saver decision and then analyzes the implications for typical ven-
dor/end user transactions that involve shrinkwrap licenses.
The analysis of the case calls into question the efficacy of many
widespread marketing practices with respect to shrinkwrap license agree-
ments-such as the placing of the shrinkwrap agreement inside the pack-
aging of the software and whether the practices are sufficient to make the
terms of such agreements govern the transaction. This article makes rec-
ommendations for altering the process by which shrinkwrap transactions
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The district court assumed without any analysis or discussion that the shrinkwrap
was, but for the Louisiana shrinkwrap statute, an unenforceable "contract of adhesion." Vault
Corp., 655 F. Supp. at 761. The Fifth Circuit did not, however, explicitly discuss the contract
of adhesion issue, so it is unclear whether the district court's observation on that issue was
shared by the Fifth Circuit. One could argue that, by analyzing whether the provision of the
Louisiana statute that would have made the disassembly prohibition enforceable was pre-
empted by federal law, the Fifth Circuit implicitly assumed that such provision in the shrink-
wrap license agreement at issue would otherwise not have been effective without the benefit of
the statute, perhaps because the entire agreement was a contract of adhesion.
14. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
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are concluded to increase the likelihood that the shrinkwrap license will
govern the transaction.
I
Summary of the Step-Saver Decision
A. Background of the Case"5
Step-Saver involved a claim by a third-party reseller, Step-Saver
Data Systems, Inc. (Step-Saver), for breach of warranties against the
software vendor, The Software Link, Inc. (TSL), which supplied a multi-
user operating system known as "Multilink Advanced" for incorporation
into a system designed for the offices of lawyers and physicians. Step-
Saver allegedly was assured by TSL's sales representatives that Multilink
Advanced was compatible with ninety percent of the available "off the
shelf" software products written to run under the MS-DOS operating
system.
Step-Saver acquired copies of Multilink Advanced by placing tele-
phone orders to TSL. TSL accepted each order on the telephone and
promised to ship the goods promptly. After placing the telephone or-
ders, Step-Saver sent a purchase order to TSL, detailing the items to be
purchased, their price, and the shipping and payment terms. TSL would
then ship the order, along with an invoice. The invoice would contain
terms specifying price, quantity, and shipping and payment terms essen-
tially identical to those on Step-Saver's purchase order.
The copies of the Multilink Advanced computer program were also
shipped by TSL with a shrinkwrap license agreement that disclaimed all
express and implied warranties save one which warranted that the disks
contained in the package were free from defects. The shrinkwrap license
also contained an integration clause and a customary statement to the
user concerning acceptance of the license agreement that read as follows:
Opening this package indicates your acceptance of these terms and
conditions. If you do not agree with them, you should promptly re-
turn the package unopened to the person from whom you purchased it
within fifteen days from date of purchase and your money will be re-
funded to you by that person.
16
Step-Saver loaded a copy of Multilink Advanced onto each system it
prepared for resale to customers, then transferred the program to the
customer upon sale of the system. Almost immediately after the installa-
tion of these systems, Step-Saver began to receive complaints from its
customers that the system did not function properly. At least a dozen
customers eventually sued Step-Saver for damages. Step-Saver referred
15. Facts are discussed fully in Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 93-98.
16. Step-Saver Data Systems v. Wyse Technology, 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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the customer complaints to TSL and to another vendor that supplied
terminals to Step-Saver, but the three companies were never able to reach
a satisfactory solution to the problems, and disputes developed concern-
ing responsibility for the problems.
Step-Saver filed a complaint against TSL, alleging breach of warran-
ties. The district court ruled in favor of TSL, holding that the shrink-
wrap license agreement constituted the complete and exclusive
agreement between Step-Saver and TSL."7 Because the shrinkwrap li-
cense disclaimed all express and implied warranties other than those set
forth in the agreement, the court excluded all evidence of the earlier oral
and written express warranties allegedly made by TSL, and granted a
directed verdict in favor of TSL.
Step-Saver appealed the decision to the Third Circuit on two
grounds. First, Step-Saver argued that the contract for each copy of the
program was formed when TSL agreed on the telephone to ship the cop-
ies in the agreed quantities and at the agreed prices. Step-Saver argued
that the shrinkwrap license constituted a material alteration to the par-
ties' contract that did not become part of the contract under U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-207.8 Alternatively, Step-Saver argued that the parties did not
intend for the shrinkwrap license to be the final and complete expression
of the terms of their agreement, and the parol evidence rule of U.C.C.
section 2-202"9 would therefore not apply to bar Step-Saver from estab-
lishing that TSL had made oral warranties with respect to the software.
TSL argued that the contract between the parties did not come into
existence until Step-Saver received the program, saw the terms of the
license, and opened the program packaging. TSL contended that too
many of the material terms of the arrangement were omitted from the
telephone discussions for those discussions to establish a contract. Sec-
ond, TSL contended that its acceptances of Step-Saver's telephone offers
were conditioned on Step-Saver's acceptance of the terms of the shrink-
wrap license, which were accepted when Step-Saver opened the program
packages. Third, TSL argued that, regardless of the method of contract
formation, Step-Saver was aware of the warranty disclaimers contained
in the shrinkwrap license and, by continuing to order and accept copies
of the program with such knowledge, Step-Saver impliedly assented to
the disclaimers.
17. Id.
18. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
19. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1992).
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B. Applicability of U.C.C. Section 2-207 to Formation of the Contract 2°
The parties agreed on appeal that the software at issue was to be
treated as a "good" within the meaning of the U.C.C., 21 so the court's
analysis focused on the provisions of the U.C.C. that should be deemed
applicable to the transactions at issue. Because this acknowledgment of
the parties concerning the applicability of the U.C.C. to non-customized
software transactions is consistent with the majority view evidenced in
the more recent case law,22 the court's analysis of the application of the
various relevant provisions of the U.C.C. to the transactions in the case is
particularly worthy of careful study.23
The court held that U.C.C. section 2-207 is the central provision
that governs the formation and content of the contract between Step-
Saver and TSL. Section 2-207 provides as follows:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a writ-
ten confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made con-
ditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for ad-
dition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writ-
ings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case
the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.24
20. See discussion in Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 93.
21. Id. at 94 n.6.
22. See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX Indus.,
Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Communications Group, Inc. v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct. 1988); see generally Robert A. Feldman,
Warranties and Disclaimers in Computer Contracts, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (Feb. 1991);
Software as Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York 756 (1985).
23. The Third Circuit's analysis in the Step-Saver case was confined to the application of
Article 2 of the U.C.C. to the transactions at issue. A more difficult and currently unsettled
issue is whether a software license will be treated the same as a "lease" subject to the provi-
sions of the new Article 2A of the U.C.C. A New York court proceeding under Article 2 prior
to the adoption of Article 2A could find no difference between a lease of goods and a license of
software. See Communications Group, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
24. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1992).
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The court concluded that, under section 2-207(3), the parties' per-
formance in their course of dealing with each other demonstrated the
recognition of a contract and was therefore legally sufficient to establish a
contract.25 The court, citing the official comment to section 2-207,26
noted that, although the parties' conduct established a contract, because
the parties had failed to adopt expressly a particular writing as the terms
of their agreement, section 2-207 must be looked to in order to determine
the precise terms of the contract.27
The court held that the parties did not mutually intend that the
shrinkwrap license constitute the final expression of, or a binding modifi-
cation to, the agreement reached by the parties as a result of the tele-
phone orders and acceptances. The president of Step-Saver had testified
without dispute that he objected to the terms of the shrinkwrap license as
applied to Step-Saver.28
Moreover, the court concluded that section 2-207 could not be used
to infer an intent on the part of Step-Saver to adopt the shrinkwrap li-
cense as the terms of the parties' agreement from the mere fact that Step-
Saver continued with the contract after receiving a writing containing
additional or different terms:
29
U.C.C. section 2-207 establishes a legal rule that proceeding with a
contract after receiving a writing that purports to define the terms of
the parties' contract is not sufficient to establish the party's consent to
the terms of the writing to the extent that the terms of the writing
either add to, or differ from, the terms detailed in the parties' earlier
writings or discussions. In the absence of a party's express assent to
the additional or different terms of the writing, section 2-207 provides
a default rule that the parties intended, as the terms of their agreement,
those terms to which both parties have agreed, along with any terms
implied by the provisions of the U.C.C.
3°
Because TSL never mentioned the shrinkwrap license during the parties'
telephone negotiations leading to the contract, nor obtained Step-Saver's
25. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98.
26. The second official comment to § 2-207 states:
Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in fact
been closed is recognized as a contract. Therefore, any additional matter contained
in the confirmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and must be re-
garded as a proposal for an added term unless the acceptance is made conditional on
the acceptance of the additional or different terms.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (1992).
27. 939 F.2d at 98.
28. Id.
29. The court noted that the drafters of § 2-207 had by that section intended to reject the
old common law "last shot rule" under which an acceptance that was not a mirror image of
the offer operated as a counteroffer, which would be deemed accepted by the original offeror if
the offeror proceeded with the contract despite the differing terms of the supposed acceptance.
Id. at 99.
30. Id.
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consent to it, the court concluded that the shrinkwrap license was "best
seen as one more form in a battle of forms" to which section 2-207 must
be applied to determine the governing terms of the parties' contract.3 1
C. Application of U.C.C. Section 2-207 to the Facts of the Case
32
1. The Definiteness of the Contract
TSL argued that the telephone offers and acceptances were insuffi-
ciently definite to form a contract because the parties did not discuss the
nature of the transaction on the telephone-sale or license-and did not
discuss warranties. The court rejected this argument, holding that the
terms on which the parties did agree over the telephone-the specific
goods involved, the quantity, and the price-were sufficiently definite to
form a contract. The court noted that the parties' rights under federal
copyright law, if the transaction were characterized as a sale, would be
nearly identical to the parties' rights under the shrinkwrap license; there-
fore it did not matter that the parties had not characterized the transac-
tion as a sale or a license over the telephone. As to warranties, the court
noted that the default rules of the U.C.C. governing warranties would fill
in the gap.33
2. The Shrinkwrap License as a Conditional Acceptance
34
TSL argued that its shrinkwrap license agreement should have been
considered a conditional acceptance under section 2-207(1) for two rea-
sons.35 First, TSL argued that the integration clause of the shrinkwrap
license and its provision that "opening this product indicates your ac-
ceptance of these terms" demonstrated that TSL's acceptance of Step-
Saver's offers was conditional on assent by Step-Saver to the additional
terms contained in the shrinkwrap agreement. Second, TSL argued that
the shrinkwrap license was itself conditional, as demonstrated by its pro-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 100.
34. Id.
35. The court indicated some doubt whether a conditional acceptance analysis was appli-
cable at all once a contract has been established by performance, but assumed that it was,
based upon the second official comment to section 2-207:
Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in fact
been closed is recognized as a contract. Therefore, any additional matter contained
in the confirmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and must be re-
garded as a proposal for an added term unless the acceptance is made conditional on
the acceptance of the additional or different terms.
Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
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vision permitting return of the product within fifteen days if the customer
did not agree to its terms.3 6
The court rejected these arguments. The court held that the test for
conditional acceptance by a party is whether the party has demonstrated
an unwillingness to proceed with the transaction unless the additional or
different terms are included in the contract.37 Using this test, the court
ruled-citing only two earlier cases, one from the Ninth Circuit and one
from the Tenth, without further discussion of the point 38-that neither
the integration clause of the shrinkwrap agreement nor the "consent by
opening" language was by itself sufficient indication that TSL was willing
to forego the transaction if the additional provisions in the shrinkwrap
agreement were not included in the contract.39
The court noted that the refund provision of the shrinkwrap license
agreement was a stronger indication that TSL was willing to forego the
contract if the terms of the shrinkwrap were not accepted by Step-Saver,
but decided that it need not decide whether such a refund offer could
ever amount to a conditional acceptance because the undisputed evidence
in the case demonstrated that the terms of the shrinkwrap were not suffi-
ciently important to TSL for it to forego the transactions altogether.'
In particular, the president of Step-Saver testified that TSL had as-
sured him that the shrinkwrap license did not apply to Step-Saver, as
Step-Saver was not the end user of the Multilink Advanced program.
Moreover, on two occasions TSL had asked Step-Saver to execute an
agreement with TSL to formalize the contractual relationship. Both pro-
posed agreements contained warranty disclaimer and limitation of rem-
edy terms similar to those in the shrinkwrap agreement. Despite the fact
that Step-Saver refused to sign the agreements, TSL continued to sell
copies of Multilink Advanced to Step-Saver.4 ' Accordingly, the court
concluded:
We see no basis in the terms of the [shrinkwrap] license for inferring
that a reasonable offeror would understand from the refund offer that
certain terms of the [shrinkwrap] license, such as the warranty dis-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1979);
Diatom v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1576 (10th Cir. 1984).
39. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 102.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 102-03. The Court was further persuaded by the fact that both parties agreed
that the shrinkwrap agreement did not represent the parties' agreement with respect to Step-
Saver's right to transfer copies of the Multilink Advanced program. Although the shrinkwrap
agreement prohibited transfer of the program, both parties agreed that Step-Saver was in fact
permitted to transfer copies of the Multilink Advanced program to the purchasers of Step-
Saver's multi-user computer system. Id. at 103.
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claimers, were essential to TSL, while others such as the non-transfera-
bility provision were not ....
The [shrinkwrap] license did not, therefore, constitute a conditional
acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-207(1).42
3. Public Policy Concerns
TSL raised a number of public policy arguments concerning the un-
toward effect an adverse ruling might have on the software industry as to
the enforceability of shrinkwrap license agreements. The court indicated
little sympathy for these arguments, noting that it was "not persuaded
that requiring software companies to stand behind representations con-
cerning their products will inevitably destroy the software industry."43
Nevertheless, the court noted that it was following the well estab-
lished distinction under the U.C.C. between conspicuous disclaimers
made available before the contract is formed-which are generally en-
forceable under the U.C.C. if not unconscionable-and disclaimers made
available only after the contract is formed-which are not enforceable.
44
"When a disclaimer is not expressed until after the contract is formed,
U.C.C. section 2-207 governs the interpretation of the contract, and, be-
tween merchants, such disclaimers, to the extent they materially alter the
parties' agreement, are not incorporated into the parties' agreement."45
4. The Terms of the Contract
46
Having concluded that the shrinkwrap license agreement did not
constitute a conditional acceptance and that a sufficiently definite con-
tract had otherwise been formed through the placing and acceptance of
orders by telephone, the court noted that the terms of the shrinkwrap
42. Id. at 103. The court also rejected TSL's argument that because Step-Saver placed
repeated orders for copies of the Multilink Advanced program with notice of the terms of the
shrinkwrap, this course of dealing eventually incorporated the shrinkwrap terms into the par-
ties' contract. The court held that such repeated exchange of forms proved only that TSL
desired that the shrinkwrap terms govern the relationship. There was particular evidence,
however, that Step-Saver had twice refused to sign agreements proposed by TSL that con-
tained disclaimers of warranties and limitations of damages similar to those in the shrinkwrap
agreement. Thus, as a matter of law, the parties' course of dealing did not operate to make the
terms of the shrinkwrap agreement applicable to the parties' transactions. Id. at 103-04.
43. Id. at 104.
44. Id. at 104-05. See, e.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982)
(disclaimer printed conspicuously on each can of a herbicide was sufficient to put a farmer on
constructive notice of the disclaimer before the contract formed, and the law would therefore
imply assent to the terms of the disclaimer upon purchase); Bowdoin v. Showell Growers, Inc.,
817 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1987) (disclaimers that were conspicuous before the contract for sale
has formed are effective; post-sale disclaimers are not).
45. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105.
46. Id.
1993]
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license must be treated as proposed additional terms governed by the
remaining provisions of U.C.C. section 2-207. Under section 2-
207(2)(b), such additional terms will not be incorporated into the parties'
contract, even as between merchants, if such terms materially alter the
parties' agreement.47
The court noted that whether certain representations made by TSL
constituted express warranties that formed part of the original contract
was primarily a question of fact that the district court must decide on
remand. However, assuming that such warranties did in fact form part
of the parties' original contract, the court held that the disclaimers of
warranties and limitations of remedies provisions of the shrinkwrap
agreement would, as a matter of law, materially alter the contract, and
would therefore not become a part of the parties' agreement under sec-
tion 2-207.48
II
Implications of the Step-Saver Decision
A. Telephone Sales or Other Direct Marketing of Software
The Step-Saver decision arose out of an unusual set of facts in which
the issue before the court was not the enforceability of a shrinkwrap li-
cense against an end user of the software, the use for which it was origi-
nally drafted, but rather its applicability to a reseller who did not use the
software other than to include it in the sale of an integrated system to an
end user.
In most cases, a software vendor and its reseller would ordinarily be
expected to have a formal contract governing the transactions between
them. Such agreement would usually address the issues of warranties,
disclaimers of liability, and the limitations of remedies that were before
the court in the Step-Saver case. Given that the shrinkwrap license at
issue in the case was intended to govern the relationship between the
vendor and the ultimate end user, and not the reseller, it is not surprising
that the court found the shrinkwrap license inapplicable to the vendor/
reseller relationship, especially in view of the particular facts of the case
in which the vendor had told the reseller that the shrinkwrap license did
not apply, and the reseller had twice rejected proposed agreements from
the vendor that included the very terms the vendor was trying to enforce
via the shrinkwrap license.
Nevertheless, the court's analysis has important ramifications for
the more common use of shrinkwrap licenses vis a vis the end user of the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 106.
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software. The most immediate and obvious application of the decision is
to the usual situation in which a software vendor accepts orders from an
end user customer over the telephone or through other direct marketing
means such as advertisements and mailings containing order forms.
In such situations, the end user is likely, while placing an order, to
specify only the same terms that were identified in the Step-Saver case-
the specific goods involved, the quantity, and the price. The court in
Step-Saver held that such terms alone were sufficiently definite to form a
contract under U.C.C. section 2-207(3). Under the analysis of Step-
Saver, when the software vendor ships an order with a shrinkwrap license
agreement in the packaging with the software, such agreement will be
treated as "one more form in a battle of forms"49 that contains terms
additional to those agreed upon at the time of acceptance of the order:
terms governing warranties, disclaimers of liability, limitations of reme-
dies, choice of law, and a host of other issues that will probably not have
been discussed at the time of the order for the software was placed.
Under section 2-207(2), because the end user will typically not be a
"merchant," such additional terms will not automatically become part of
the agreement between the parties.50 Moreover, as in Step-Saver, it will
usually be the case that the vendor will be unable to prove that the par-
ties mutually intended for the shrinkwrap license to constitute the final
expression of, or a binding modification to, the agreement reached by the
parties on the telephone, since the shrinkwrap license probably will not
have been mentioned by the vendor's sales people before shipment of the
order.
Given this situation, under the analysis of Step-Saver, the vendor
will be able to establish the terms of the shrinkwrap license as the gov-
erning embodiment of the parties' agreement only if the vendor can es-
tablish that its acceptance of the telephone order or other direct
marketing order was "expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms"51 contained in the shrinkwrap license. The
Step-Saver case makes this more difficult to do, for the court explicitly
rejected the argument that an integration clause and/or a provision stat-
ing that "opening this package indicates your acceptance of these terms"
were of themselves sufficient to demonstrate a conditional acceptance.
Moreover, the test adopted by the court for judging a conditional accept-
49. Id. at 99.
50. Even if the parties engaging in the transaction are both merchants, it is highly likely
that such additional terms will materially alter the risks to each party of the transaction, par-
ticularly since the shrinkwrap provisions governing warranties and remedies will typically cut
back significantly on those that the U.C.C. would otherwise afford to the purchaser. In such
event, the additional terms will most likely not form a part of the contract under section 2-207.
51. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1992).
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ance-whether the vendor can demonstrate an unwillingness to proceed
with the transaction unless the terms of the shrinkwrap license are gov-
erning-will often be difficult to prove, especially if orders are routinely
accepted through transactions in which the shrinkwrap license is never
mentioned or discussed.
The court in Step-Saver, however, did leave open the question
whether a provision in a shrinkwrap agreement allowing for a refund if
the purchaser does not agree with the terms of the agreement is sufficient
to establish a conditional acceptance. As a practical matter, it seems
likely that in most cases a software vendor will be unable to point to any
instances in which a refund was actually given to a customer who ob-
jected to a shrinkwrap license. Therefore, it may be difficult for a
software vendor to convince a court that the refund provision by itself
should be sufficient to prove a conditional acceptance of each and every
order.
Accordingly, to bolster the vendor's chance of being able to demon-
strate an acceptance conditional upon the terms of the vendor's shrink-
wrap license agreement, the vendor should consider taking the following
actions:
(1) The vendor should instruct its sales personnel to mention briefly
to every customer who calls to place an order that the order is being
accepted conditioned upon the customer's acceptance of the vendor's
shrinkwrap license agreement that will be shipped with the product. The
sales person should, if possible, also briefly explain the vendor's refund
policy in the event the customer does not accept the terms of the shrink-
wrap license and should state that the customer may receive a copy of the
shrinkwrap license before placing an order if desired.
Similarly, advertisements, mailings, and other forms of direct mar-
keting containing an order form should state in writing that acceptance
of all orders will be conditioned upon the terms of a shrinkwrap license
agreement, a copy of which should be available in advance upon a pur-
chaser's request to the vendor.
(2) The shrinkwrap agreement itself should also state explicitly-
which most currently do not-that the vendor's acceptance of the trans-
action with the licensee is conditioned upon the terms of the shrinkwrap
license and that the vendor is not willing to enter into the transaction if
the customer is not willing to accept such terms. Sample "header" lan-
guage for the shrinkwrap agreement might be as follows:
WARNING: XYZ SOFTWARE CORPORATION IS WILLING
TO LICENSE THE ENCLOSED SOFTWARE TO YOU ONLY
UPON THE CONDITION THAT YOU ACCEPT ALL OF THE
TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT.
PLEASE READ THE TERMS CAREFULLY BEFORE OPENING
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THIS PACKAGE, AS OPENING THE PACKAGE WILL INDI-
CATE YOUR ASSENT TO THEM. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO
THESE TERMS, THEN XYZ SOFTWARE CORPORATION IS
UNWILLING TO LICENSE THE SOFTWARE TO YOU, IN
WHICH EVENT YOU SHOULD RETURN THE UNOPENED
PACKAGE TO THE PLACE FROM WHICH IT WAS AC-
QUIRED, AND YOUR MONEY WILL BE REFUNDED.
(3) The vendor should, of course, accept returns from and make
refunds to any customer who wishes to avail itself of the refund policy.
In addition, the vendor should obligate its distributors, in writing, to do
the same.
B. "Over the Counter" Sales of Software
The application of the Step-Saver analysis to the situation in which
software is sold "over the counter"-that is, in transactions in which the
software vendor and the purchaser do not ever deal directly with one
another, as in a computer superstore52 -is more uncertain. In such situ-
ations, the face-to-face "offer" and "acceptance" process, which led the
court in Step-Saver to conclude that a contract was formed over the tele-
phone (prior to receipt of the shrinkwrap agreement) under the provi-
sions of section 2-207(3), is absent.
One could argue that the simple act by the vendor of placing copies
for purchase, and the selection of such copies for purchase by the cus-
tomer, constitute "[c]onduct by both parties which recognizes the exist-
ence of a contract" that is "sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a con-
tract. '5 3 Because, however, the purchasers in these types of transactions
will not ordinarily be "merchants," the terms of the shrinkwrap license,
to the extent they are deemed to be "additional terms" to the contract,
will not automatically become part of the contract under section 2-
207(2).
It seems likely that the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement will be
considered "additional terms" under section 2-207. In the usual case, it
is probable that the purchaser in an over-the-counter transaction is, at
the time of selecting the software package for purchase, considering only
the same three terms-the specific goods, the quantity, and the price-
that were at issue in the Step-Saver case when the contract was formed by
telephone. The difference in the over-the-counter transaction is that the
52. A resale of a vendor's software by an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer-
dealers who purchase and configure hardware and/or software for resale to end users) or other
third-party value added reseller presents an analogous situation in which the vendor and the
ultimate end user never deal directly with one another.
53. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1992).
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shrinkwrap license agreement is not sent to the purchaser after consum-
mation of the transaction, as it was in Step-Saver, and therefore it at least
potentially forms a part of the transaction at the time of its formation.
The central issue, therefore, that would seem to govern whether the
shrinkwrap license terms in fact form a part of the contract is whether
the vendor can establish that its "acceptance" of the transaction was "ex-,
pressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms"
contained in the shrinkwrap license.54 For the following reasons, it
seems a necessary condition to an affirmative answer on this issue that
the shrinkwrap license agreement be readily visible to the purchaser at
the time of selection of the product, or at least that there be some readily
identifiable notice to the purchaser on the packaging or through some
other mechanism that the transaction is to be made subject to a shrink-
wrap license, a copy of which is available to the purchaser from the
dealer before consummation of the purchase.
If the shrinkwrap agreement is not visible to the purchaser at the
time of consummation of the initial transaction, but rather becomes
known to the purchaser only later, then the transaction is akin to the
facts of the Step-Saver case. The analysis of that case would then suggest
that the contract may be deemed formed only on the terms in the buyer's
mind at the time of purchaser-the specific goods, quantity, and price-
with the remainder of the terms to be filled in by the U.C.C.
The shrinkwrap license constitutes virtually the only mechanism in
an over-the-counter transaction by which the software vendor can "ex-
pressly" make its acceptance of the transaction "conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms" contained in the shrinkwrap license."
For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that the shrinkwrap
license agreement be made plainly visible to the purchaser of the software
before purchase.56 Because the Step-Saver case held that a mere state-
ment that opening the package constitutes acceptance of the terms of the
agreement is not sufficient to make the vendor's acceptance of the trans-
54. Id. § 2-207(1).
55. Id.
56. As a compromise, the vendor might state clearly on the outside of the packaging of
the product that use of the software is governed by a license agreement contained inside the
packaging, and that the vendor is unwilling to enter into the transaction on any other terms.
Under Step-Saver, however, it is probable that unless the purchaser can readily obtain a copy
of the license agreement prior to purchase-such as from the dealer-the terms of the license
agreement will be considered "additional terms" under U.C.C. § 2-207 that do not form a part
of the transaction. Because it may not be practical from a marketing standpoint to require
dealers to maintain copies of all shrinkwrap license agreements contained in products sold by
the dealer for review by purchasers before consummation of a transaction, a compromise
might be to list on the packaging a toll-free telephone number from which the purchaser can
obtain a complete copy of the shrinkwrap license in advance of purchase. However, where
[Vol. 15:653
action conditional, and because the case doesnot decide whether the
availability of a refund is of itself sufficient, the license should expressly
state that the vendor is unwilling to license the software unless the pur-
chaser agrees to the terms of the shrinkwrap license agreement, as set
forth in the sample language above. Placing of the terms of the shrink-
wrap license agreement only on the envelope containing the software me-
dia inside the product package is not recommended. Finally, the
software vendor should obligate its third-party distribution channels to
accept returns of the software for a refund in accordance with the provi-
sions of the shrinkwrap license agreement.
III
Conclusion
The enforceability of shrinkwrap license agreements has been, and
remains, the subject of considerable doubt. Apart from the question
whether such agreements constitute unenforceable contracts of adhesion,
the Vault pair of cases focused on the enforceability of particular sub-
stantive provisions of a shrinkwrap license.
The more recent Step-Saver case focuses on the contract formation
process itself, and places new traps in that process based upon various
provisions of U.C.C. section 2-207. Following the majority view exhib-
ited in recent case law, software vendors should assume that the U.C.C.
will probably be held applicable to shrinkwrap license transactions. Step-
Saver calls into question whether many widespread marketing practices
with respect to shrinkwrap license agreements will be sufficient to make
the terms of such agreements govern the transaction. Many vendors, for
example, place the shrinkwrap license agreement inside the packaging of
the software, and only after the user opens the package, which generally
does not occur until after the purchase is consummated, is he or she able
to review the terms of the agreement.
possible, the better approach is to make the entire agreement visible to the user on the outside
of the packaging.
Quite apart from questions of contract formation, it is also important that the shrinkwrap
license be visible to the user prior to purchase to aid the enforceability of the disclaimers of
warranties and other limitations of liability that are.common in such license agreements. Dis-
claimers that are conspicuous before the contract for sale has formed have been upheld; post-
sale disclaimers have not. See cases cited supra note 44. Thus, if a company is unable or
unwilling to make the entire license agreement visible to the user on the outside of the packag-
ing before purchase, at a minimum a conspicuous notice of disclaimer of warranties and limita-
tions of liability should be placed on the packaging. Such notice makes the user aware of the
disclaimers and limitations before purchase, as required by the U.C.C., and avoids relying on
the shrinkwrap license as the vehicle for delivering such notice, should the shrinkwrap license
be held unenforceable.
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In light of the court's analysis of section 2-207 in Step-Saver, the
shrinkwrap agreement should be plainly visible to the purchaser prior to
the purchase transaction so that its terms may be read before consumma-
tion of the transaction. In addition, software vendors should expressly
state in the shrinkwrap agreement that the vendor is unwilling to license
the software unless the purchaser agrees to the terms of the shrinkwrap
agreement.
For telephone sales, the vendor's sales personnel should inform the
purchaser on the telephone that the transaction is being accepted by the
vendor conditioned upon the purchaser's acceptance of a shrinkwrap li-
cense agreement, and that the vendor is unwilling to enter into the trans-
action on any other terms. Similarly, direct marketing sales pieces
should also state that acceptance of the transaction by the vendor is con-
ditioned upon the terms of the shrinkwrap license agreement. In all
cases of direct sales, the vendor should offer to make a copy of the
shrinkwrap license agreement available to the purchaser before purchase,
if desired.
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